S: You gave me a glimpse of the flexibility of mathematics when it comes to
labelling numbers. Can we not also have some degree of flexibility where logic
is concerned?
P: Logic is defined as a system of principles governing correct and reliable
inference, a particular method of reasoning or argumentation that can be
applied to any branch of knowledge. Flexibility? In mathematics? You mean,
applying a different set of rules than those we have always accepted to prove or
disprove conjectures?
S: Yes, in a certain sense. You just said that logic is a “particular method of
reasoning”. If this ‘particular’ method is replaced by another ‘particular’ one
that is, well, complete and free of self-contradiction, shouldn’t we accept its
conclusions, even though they may appear to differ from what we hold to be
established truth?
P: I cannot say unless I am given the opportunity to examine such a different
system. Do you happen to have one in mind?
S: I do, and it’s very simple to explain.
P: Let’s hear it, then.
S: In the curren t grading scheme, a final average of 90 is awarded an A, is it not?
P: It is.
S: But what would you do if someone had an average of 89.5? Would you not be
thinking that perhaps this was due to a possible slight inaccuracy in the
allocation of points to various parts of the solution, or to your mood on the
day as affected by environmental or other subjective factors? Would it not seem
to you a bit inequitable to give an A to someone who scored 90 and a B to
someone who scored 89.5 over six quizzes, three class tests, and a final exam?
Would your conscience not feel a pang of guilt if you were to base your
decision on such a minute difference? Would you not be inclined, in the
interest of fairness and justice, to extend the A also to the 89.5 candidate?
P: Depending on the overall circumstances, yes, I might.
S: Very well. We have now established that 89.5 is A-standard. Then, applying
the same logic again, would you not conclude that 89 is also A-standard?
P: I see where you are going. You have just indirectl y enunciated a theorem that I
would call ‘Truth by Close Proximity’, which, for the non-mathematical mind,
could be summarized as “If a is close enough to b, then a is equal to b.”
S: Sounds about right.
P: Unfortunately, there are three essential things that are wrong with your
alternative logic. First, it is based on feelings and emotions, not on cold and
indisputable factual reality. Second, what exactly is meant by ‘close enough’?
What precise, specific number would quantify this detail? And third—and most
important and dangerous aspect of it—your theorem is open to symmetric
application.
S: I don’
t understand...
P: What is your final score in my course?
S: 75.
C. Constanda